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Attesting to Unique Attractions:
The Significance of the President’s Commission
on Organized Crime (1984–1986) Gambling Hearings
David G. Schwartz
I want you to understand that we are not holding this hearing for the purpose of suggesting that gam-
bling should be eliminated from the United States. It is impossible. It has been with us as long as we
have been a nation. What we are looking for, however, is to prevent the infiltration by organized
crime into gambling. And it seems to be a very fertile field.1
Chairman Irving Kaufman, President’s Commission on Organized Crime
INTRODUCTION
The federal government has had a curiousrelationship with gambling. For much of its his-
tory, the national public policy towards gambling
was simple: prohibition, despite the audacity of a
few laggard states in experimenting with legaliza-
tion schemes. Towards the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, the national policy shifted, at first to
tolerance of legal gambling to endorsement of it.
The five primary federal studies of gambling con-
ducted in the twentieth century—the Kefauver
Committee (1950–2), the President’s Crime Com-
mission (1967), the Commission to Review the
National Policy on Gambling (1974–6), the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Organized Crime (1984–6),
and the National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion (1997–9)—illustrate the shifting federal per-
ception of and approach to legalized gambling. Of
these four studies, the Kefauver has received the
most thorough scholarly inquiry, while the Presi-
dent’s Commission has been largely overlooked.
But the President’s Commission represented an im-
portant moment in the national discourse on legal
gambling. As the first national look at casino gam-
bling as it made the transition from a Nevada
novelty to a widespread tool of economic develop-
ment and revenue enhancement, it paved the way
for the National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion’s (NGISC) even-handed treatment of gambling
at the end of the next decade, even as it represented
the final bulwark of the receding prohibitionist ap-
proach to gambling legalization.
The previous obscurity of the President’s Com-
mission in the historical and popular literature re-
flects the subordinate role that gambling had
within the larger scope of the Commission’s pro-
ceedings, which were, in the words of Senator
Charles E. Grassley, acting chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, ‘‘to investigate the nature of
organized crime as it exists today and examine
where it is headed in the future, its sources of
power, and as well, to recommend ways to combat
its influence on American life.’’2 To illustrate the
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1President’s Commission on Organized Crime, Record
of Hearing VII, June 24–26, 1985, New York, New
York: Organized Crime and Gambling 37 (1985) [herein-
after Commission Hearings].
2A Joint Resolution to Authorize the President’s Commission on
Organized Crime to Compel the Attendance and Testimony of
Witnesses and the Production of Information: Hearing Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Session, or
S.J. Res. 233, Serial No. J-98-120, 1 (May 9, 1984).
GAMING LAW REVIEW AND ECONOMICS
Volume 17, Number 8, 2013
 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089/glre.2013.1785
560
significant, but relatively minor, role gambling had
in the overall investigations, the gambling hearings
lasted three days out of a thirty-four month investi-
gative process. What was the Commission’s pri-
mary focus? According to criminologist Jay S.
Albanese, the President’s Commission was most no-
table for addressing the emergence of non-Italian
organized crime and, in particular, ‘‘the overlapping
problems of the drug trade and money laundering.’’
This was in contrast to the emphasis that the 1967
President’s Crime Commission placed on illegal
gambling and Italian-American organized crime.3
Thus, even though the primary consideration of the
President’s Commission was how organized crime
used its illegal gambling operations and its infiltration
of legal gambling to profit, it held out thepossibility of
a regime of legal gambling free fromorganized crime.
In doing so, it represented a retrenchment from the at-
titudes current at the time of theKefauver Committee,
which had concluded that gambling in America was
inherently a criminal enterprise:
The legalization of gambling would not termi-
nate the widespread predatory activities of
criminal gangs and syndicates. The history of
legalized gambling in Nevada.gives no as-
surance that mobsters and racketeers can be
converted into responsible businessmen
through the simple process of obtaining State
and local licenses for their gambling enter-
prises. Gambling, moreover, historically has
been associated with cheating and corruption.4
By abandoning once and for all the Kefauver impera-
tive that ‘‘gamblers’’ (those who ran gambling opera-
tions, not those who enjoyed recreational gambling)
were incorrigibly ‘‘mobsters and racketeers,’’ the
President’s Commission reflected an ongoing federal
rapprochement with gambling. This de´tente came as
states increasingly turned to public interest gambling
(state-run and privately run gambling operations li-
censed and taxed for the public benefit), as the spread
of lotteries in the 1970s and 1980s accelerated a pro-
cess that had begun as far back in the 1920s with pari-
mutuel wagering on horse races.5 By the end of the
decade, the federal government itself had embraced
high-stakes bingo and casino gambling on Indian res-
ervation lands as both a legal and a viable, even de-
sirable, engine of tribal economic development.6
During the 1990s, states turned to previously
taboo (outside of Nevada and, later, New Jersey)
casino gambling for both revenue and economic
development. Had the federal government main-
tained its previous stance on gambling—that it
was fundamentally a criminal business, and that
its legalization was to be strongly discouraged—it
is unlikely that states would have turned as enthusi-
astically towards casino gambling in the 1990s as
they in fact did. From that perspective, the Presi-
dent’s Commission’s gambling hearings are a touch-
stone for the shifting federal understanding of
gambling, which was informed by the states’ escalat-
ing authorization of gambling and sanctioned present
and future public-interest gambling regimes.
GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE COMMISSION
Organized crime had been recognized as a signif-
icant national problem since the convening of the
Kefauver Committee in 1950. It received renewed
federal interest during the attorney generalship of
Robert Kennedy, and, in the wake of a general rise
in lawlessness, the President’s Crime Commission,
meeting in 1967, made an additional study of why
Kennedy’s anti-mob measures had not yielded
success.
By the Reagan years, prosecutors had been using
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) statute to disrupt classic La Cosa Nostra
(LCN) crime families for over a decade. But con-
cerns remained, as Italian organized crime proved
resilient, and as other ethnic groups proved just as
eager to break the law.
Despite his avowed aim in cutting the federal
budget, Ronald Reagan was bullish on beefing up
federal anti-mob resources. In proposing a consider-
able escalation of the federal law enforcement bud-
get, he argued that:
[This] was not at all inconsistent with my own
long-held belief that when Government grows
3Jay S. Albanese. Organized Crime in Our Times 198
(2011).
4Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce
[Kefauver Committee] 2 (1951).
5David G. Schwartz. Roll the Bones: The History of
Gambling 369 (1st ed. 2006).
6Id. at 435–6.
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big and bloated and gets into areas where it’s
neither competent nor wanted, it also tends
to ignore its important Constitutional duties.
Duties like providing for the national defense,
and, in this case, protecting its citizens from
criminal wrongdoing. The Federal Govern-
ment’s deficits were not due to too much
money being spent for law-enforcement pur-
poses; spending had been dramatically re-
duced in the 70s as a percentage of the
Federal budget, so our plan would be a step to-
ward redressing an imbalance.7
As part of his refocusing of federal dollars and law
enforcement priorities, Reagan made the decision to
authorize yet another federal study of gambling, in
keeping with his decision to make the fight against
organized crime a first-term priority.
On July 28, 1983, President Reagan signed Exec-
utive Order 12435, which created the President’s
Commission on Organized Crime. He charged the
Commission to:
make a full and complete national and region-
by-region analysis of organized crime; define
the nature of traditional organized crime as
well as emerging organized crime groups,
the sources and amounts of organized crime’s
income, and the uses to which organized crime
puts its income; develop in-depth [sic] infor-
mation on the participants in organized crime
networks; and evaluate Federal laws pertinent
to the effort to combat organized crime. The
Commission shall advise the President and
the Attorney General with respect to its find-
ings and actions which can be undertaken to
improve law enforcement efforts directed
against organized crime, and make recommen-
dations concerning appropriate administrative
and legislative improvements and improve-
ments in the administration of justice.8
After signing the order establishing the Commis-
sion, Reagan announced his 20 appointments as
commissioners. They were:
 Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit since
1961 and a former judge on the Southern Dis-
trict Court of New York. Reagan also tabbed
Kaufman as chair of the Commission.
 Phyllis Teresa Aranza (later Wunsche), a lieu-
tenant with the homicide division of the Hous-
ton Police Department who was pursuing a
masters degree in criminal justice at Sam
Houston State University.
 Jesse A. Brewer, Jr., a member of the Los
Angeles Police Department since 1947 and
its deputy chief since 1981, with responsibility
for supervision of numerous major crimes in-
vestigations.
 Carol Corrigan, a deputy district attorney
assigned to the senior felony staff for Alameda
County and an assistant professor of law at the
University of California Hastings College of
Law.
 Justin J. Dintino, executive officer of the New
Jersey State Police Department and general
chairman of the law enforcement intelligence
unit. An expert on fighting the mob, he also
served on the Organized Crime Committee of
the International Association of Chiefs of
Police and the policy board of the Middle At-
lantic-Great Lakes State Organized Crime
Law Enforcement Network.
 John F. Duffy, San Diego County sheriff since
1970.
 William J. Guste, Jr., attorney general of Loui-
siana.
 Judith Richards Hope, a partner in the DC law
office of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky, and Walker.
 Phillip Manuel, the chief investigator of the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Investigations from 1968 to
1979 and currently a private consultant assisting
with the investigation of economic crimes.
 Thomas McBride, associate dean of the Stan-
ford University Law School and an Associate
Watergate Special Prosecutor.
 Eugene Methvin, a senior editor of Readers
Digest, a specialist in organized crime who
had contributed to the passage of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.
 Edwin L. Miller, Jr., district attorney for San
Diego County and incoming president of the
National Association for District Attorneys.
7Ronald Reagan, Declaring War on Organized Crime, N.Y.
Times. Jan. 12, 1986.
8President’s Commission on Organized Crime, Exec. Order No.
12435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34723 ( July 28, 1983), available at
< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid = 41647> .
562 SCHWARTZ
 Manuel J. Reyes, a Miami attorney who had
been active in fighting against drugs in South-
ern Florida.
 Democratic representative Peter W. Rodino,
Jr., of New Jersey, chairman of the House Judi-
ciary Committee; he is best known for having
overseen the impeachment hearings of Richard
Nixon.
 Charles H. Rogovin, a professor of law at Tem-
ple University, who had an extensive back-
ground in the study of organized crime.
 Barbara Ann Rowan, a lawyer in private prac-
tice and former assistant director with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
 Frances A. Sclafani, the first woman to serve as
deputy chief of the major offense bureau of the
Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office and
the associate director of the National District
Attorney’s Association.
 Samuel K. Skinner, an attorney in private prac-
tice and former chairman of the [Illinois] Gov-
ernor’s Fraud Prevention Commission and U.S.
attorney for the Northern District of Illinois,
where from 1968 to 1975, he oversaw major
organized crime investigations.
 Retired associate justice of the Supreme Court
(1958 to 1981) Potter Stewart.
 Republican Senator Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina, current chairman of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee.9
Of the members, nearly half (five prosecutors and
four law enforcement officers) were involved in
the prosecution of organized crime. Three were pri-
vate attorneys with former government experience
at varying levels; two were judges (one a retired
Supreme Court justice); two were law professors;
three were not directly affiliated with law enforce-
ment or government, but had professional speciali-
zation that qualified them; and two were members
of Congress who represented the House and the
Senate and the two major parties.
With its membership set (though Duffy did not
subsequently serve), the Commission began hiring
staff and filling out its calendar. With a mandate
to create interim reports and to file its final report
by March 1, 1986, it would have been a busy
three years for the commissioners and staff, even
if things ran smoothly—which they did not.
The body was split by discord before even meet-
ing; its first executive director, longtime federal
prosecutor Peter Vaira, resigned after a dispute
with Chairman Kaufman, and battles with the
Justice Department over the Commission’s
independence—and the extent to which it would
be auditing the department’s reaction to organized
crime, as opposed to merely beating the drum for
greater legislative and financial resources for the
department’s organized crime efforts—delayed its
implementation.10
By November 1983, the President’s Commission
was ready to begin eliciting testimony, and started
its hearings with an overview of the changing nature
of organized crime, with Attorney General William
French Smith highlighting the growing internation-
alization of crime, and FBI director WilliamWebster
providing a catalog of his organization’s current un-
derstanding of LCN’s national size and scope.11
From there, the President’s Commission heard a
variety of topics, including the growing issues pre-
sented by Asian organized crime and the interna-
tional scourge of money laundering. In October
1984, it issued an interim report, The Cash Connec-
tion: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions, and
Money Laundering, highlighting its most significant
work to date in the area.12
Given the President’s Commission’s vast scope
(tackling all of organized crime), compressed
schedule, and the lack of anything specific to gam-
bling in the group’s initial charge, it would have
been forgiven for not examining gambling. But, be-
fore the Commission filed its final report, it would
find time to consider—at least in brief—the threat
posed to gambling by organized crime, as well as
the problems that both raised for society in general.
THE COMMISSION’S
GAMBLING HEARINGS
The Commission approached gambling primarily
through the lens of organized crime; while it
9Appointment of the Membership of the President’s Commis-
sion on Organized Crime ( July 28, 1983), < http://www.reagan
.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/72883c.htm > .
10Philip Shenon, U.S. Crime Panel: Discord to the End, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 1986.
11Leslie Maitland, New Crime Groups Assailed by Smith, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 30, 1983, at A27.
12Excerpts from U.S. Report on Crime, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1984, at A24.
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acknowledged the growth and success of legal gam-
bling, it held that virtually all legal gambling had, to
varying degrees, been corrupted by organized crime.
As Chairman Kaufman said as a prologue to the first
day’s testimony, in a brief summary of the Commis-
sion’s views that is a mission statement of sorts:
Gambling is as old as our nation’s history, and
the incestuous relationship between illegal ac-
tivities and gambling has existed for almost as
long. Periodically every form of commercial
gambling has been infected by corruption,
attesting to the unique attraction between or-
ganized crime groups and gambling’s financial
promise. Horse racing, casino operations, pro-
fessional sports, state run lotteries—legal
gambling of all kinds has been infiltrated in
some form, at some time or other, by orga-
nized crime. Not only the traditional organized
crime groups, but also numerous emerging
groups, participate in the lucrative illegal gam-
bling market.13
Thus, gambling wasn’t itself the product of orga-
nized crime, but it was almost inherently a major at-
traction for organized crime groups. This seems like
a semantic distinction, but it speaks to the growing
size of the ‘‘legitimate’’ (i.e., state-sanctioned and
taxed) gambling industry in the United States. Pre-
vious federal investigations into gambling consid-
ered it primarily as a criminal problem. Estes
Kefauver, impressed by the vigor of anti-crime ad-
vocates nationwide, had log-rolled a Senate special
committee into existence to investigate crime, with
a particular emphasis on gambling. The Senate res-
olution approving the Committee, likely to assuage
the fears of powerful Nevada senator Pat McCarran
(who molded the resolution as finally approved by
the body), specifically noted that the committee
was not authorized to recommend ‘‘any change in
the laws of.states relative to gambling,’’ to effect
any change in those laws, or to interfere in the
slightest with the rights of states ‘‘to prohibit, legal-
ize, or in any way regulate gambling within their
borders.’’14 That McCarran needed to expend polit-
ical capital to forestall federal action against gam-
bling within the borders of states demonstrates the
threat that, in his assessment, the Kefauver Commit-
tee potentially posed to Nevada gaming. Unfettered,
this committee might try to dismantle Nevada’s re-
gime of state-regulated casino gambling.
The President’s Commission, in contrast, while
not blind to organized crime’s ongoing entangle-
ments in gambling—both legal and illegal—didn’t
share the Kefauver perspective that all gambling
was inherently criminal. By contrast, the President’s
Commission was explicitly charged, in part, with
determining ‘‘how law enforcement policies should
be changed to accommodate the widespread accep-
tance of gambling.’’15
The gambling inquiry was the seventh set of
hearings the Commission conducted.16 Each of the
three days had its own focus, ranging from the gen-
eral question of legalization vs. prohibition to sports
betting to legal casino gaming. The Commission
was to hear from a diverse array of witnesses, rang-
ing from law enforcement officers to legal gambling
entrepreneurs to recanted criminals, in search of the
truth about the intersections between gambling,
legal and illegal, and organized crime.
Day one
At 9:40 in the morning on Monday, June 24,
1985, at Federal Hall in New York City, President’s
Commission Chair Irving Kaufman took the ros-
trum and welcomed attendees to the hearing,
where he started by proclaiming that, ‘‘If there is
one common theme that emerged from our work
so far, it is that money is the lifeblood of organized
crime,’’ and that, ‘‘a significant part of organized
crime’s income is derived from gambling.’’ Indeed,
he emphasized, ‘‘The importance of gambling as a
continuing source of revenue for organized crime
cannot be underestimated,’’ citing studies that indi-
cated $1.5 billion was spent annually in the New
York area alone on illegal wagering controlled by
organized crime. Furthermore, a survey of state
and local law enforcement authorities indicated
that they, too, felt gambling was a large source of in-
come for organized crime—in the northeastern
United States, the largest single source of income.
Though he admitted that these estimates must be
viewed critically (‘‘because it is difficult to deter-
mine precisely the total amount of money
13Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at vi.
14S. Res. 202, 81st Cong. (2d Sess. 1950).
15Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at v.
16Ronald Koziol, Legalized Gambling Proposed, Expert Urges
Cutting Crime Families’ Income Chicago Tribune, June 25,
1985.
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wagered’’), he stated that it was ‘‘clear’’ that ‘‘gam-
bling provides organized crime with the money it
needs to flourish,’’ and was responsible for a host of
other problems, like the ‘‘fixing’’ of sporting events.17
Finally, Kaufman reminded those present of the
changing nature of gambling:
In recent years, jurisdictions throughout the
country have expanded the availability of var-
ious forms of legalized gambling. This has, of
course, occurred in the New York area with the
establishment of legalized lotteries and with
proposals for instituting other forms of legal-
ized wagering in New York. The Commission
will be concerned at this hearing and in its rec-
ommendations in alerting local governments
to the ways in which organized crime is able
to infiltrate, exploit, and profit from legalized
gambling. Our goal must be to devise ways to
prevent the criminals from sharing in the prof-
its from gambling—legal or illegal.18
With that, he turned the rostrum over to investigator
Ray Mollenhoff, who discussed the general outline
of the proceedings—a series of specific case studies
that would demonstrate how organized crime could
control both legal and illegal gambling. He high-
lighted illegal sports gambling, the daily numbers
lottery, and clandestine casinos as the chief
money-makers for organized crime. Nationally,
law enforcement authorities estimated gambling as
second only to drug smuggling and sales as an
organized-crime money-maker. Mollenhoff singled
out sports betting, which remained illegal in every
state but Nevada, as the top illegal gambling
revenue-producer.19
Mollenhoff walked those present through the
blueprint for the next three days of testimony, also
offering in conclusion an editorial note about the
law enforcement challenges unique to gambling:
. the public’s perception of gambling con-
jures up a benevolent image, unlike narcotics
trafficking, extortion, prostitution, public cor-
ruption, and the many other faces of the
mob. Unlike these enterprises, gambling gen-
erates ‘‘high profits,’’ but with ‘‘low risk’’ of
apprehension, conviction, or incarceration.
Unlike narcotics and labor racketeering, gambling
enjoyed a largely positive public image, despite
the danger posed by criminal elements enriching
themselves by it. For that reason, it was difficult
to rouse the public against gambling crime. This
was to be considered a complication of enforce-
ment efforts, and not necessarily a vindication of
gambling.
In any event, the first witness then took the stand:
professor of law (jurisprudence and social policy) at
the University of California, Berkeley, Jerome H.
Skolnick, widely regarded as one of the leading ac-
ademic experts on organized crime. In his introduc-
tion, deputy chief counsel Stanley Hunterton ticked
off Skolnick’s qualifications, which started with his
‘‘less formal’’ study of gambling at the age of nine,
when his father took him to the Belmont race course
in Long Island, New York, and taught him how to
read a racing form.20 His academic study of gam-
bling had culminated in the 1978 monograph
House of Cards: Legalization and Control of
Casino Gambling, which, through academic analy-
sis and participant observation, dissected the system
of Nevada casino regulation as it was in the 1970s.21
Sklonick was an affable witness, sure of his testi-
mony despite the reservations he must have known
his audience would have with it. ‘‘My problem,’’ he
warned Commission members, ‘‘is going to be how
to tell you everything you always wanted to know
about gambling but were afraid to ask—in what
Stan Hunterton tells me is only twenty minutes.’’22
After hazarding a few casual theories for the pop-
ularity of gambling as an activity, Sklonick noted
that gambling had become ‘‘even more popular’’
in the decade since the Commission on the Review
of the National Policy toward Gambling had met,
with the legalization of lotteries in many states—
in the case of California, over the opposition of
the state’s governor and law enforcement authori-
ties. This was evidence of the good public image
gambling enjoyed, which Mollenhoff had alluded
to. ‘‘Clearly,’’ Skolnick said, ‘‘gambling is not
perceived as a deplorable evil by an overwhelming
majority of Americans.’’23




21Jerome H. Skolnick, House of Cards: Legalization
and Control of Casino Gambling (1978).
22Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 12.
23Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 13.
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Sklonick argued against a monolithic view of
gambling, positing that lotteries, as ‘‘shallow
play,’’ were substantially different from gambling
that was ‘‘deep play,’’ which, following Jeremy Ben-
tham, he defined as gambling in which the pain of
losing the sum wagered was greater than the plea-
sure of potentially winning it.24 Lotteries, by con-
trast, featured small betting amounts, and were in
essence ‘‘the mirror image of insurance,’’ in which
a pool of bettors kicked in a small amount, to
which a winner was selected by chance as the ben-
eficiary. In addition, they were an alternative to tax-
ation for ‘‘useful public works.’’ Finally, the lottery
had only ‘‘remote’’ connections to organized crime,
and Skolnick believed that legal lotteries could re-
place the illegal ‘‘numbers’’ rackets run by orga-
nized crime.25
After briefly discussing the morality of deep
play, Skolnick moved on to the inconsistency of
public policy on gambling. ‘‘It is difficult to control
illegal sports betting, for example,’’ he said, ‘‘in an
environment and a society that permits casino gam-
bling, horseracing, and lotteries.’’26 And he
impressed upon the Commission the importance
of asking the correct questions:
. regarding each gambling form, we should
ask the following questions: What is the goal
of government policy? What are we trying to
achieve by our three main governmental op-
tions—prohibition, permission, and promo-
tion? Do we approve the situation we’ve
created? And, finally, what can be done
about it if we don’t approve?27
The goals of legalization, according to Skolnick,
were of paramount importance. Nevada, for exam-
ple, had legalized casino gambling to generate rev-
enue and, in his estimation, only turned to serious
regulation of the industry after the threat of federal
involvement in the 1960s. Indeed, when he began
studying Nevada gaming in 1974, Sklonick had
been told that organized crime ‘‘was out’’ of the
state. Over the next few years, however, revelations
about the continuing presence of organized crime
groups in Nevada casinos made it clear that
wasn’t the case.28
New Jersey, on the other hand, had legalized ca-
sinos not for general revenue purposes, but to pro-
mote economic development of Atlantic City,
which should have meant stricter regulatory
controls, though the reality of political imperatives
meant some shortcuts in the process, including the
granting of a temporary license for Resorts Interna-
tional, the state’s first legal casino, in 1978.29 Skol-
nick recommended that states looking to legalize
casinos first made that they knew what they wanted
from legalization; and second, maximized control
of the industry as a reality.30
Finally, Skolnick discussed the option of legaliz-
ing gambling not for revenue, and not for resort re-
newal, but primarily to ‘‘control the purveyors of
gambling.’’31 If accepted by the Commission, this
would represent a stark reversal of the federal atti-
tude towards gambling. Given, Skolnick said, ‘‘the
frank recognition that the activity is socially accept-
able,’’ legalizing gambling to better control it was
the government’s best option. England, for example,
legalized casinos not for revenue, but to keep orga-
nized crime away from the industry. Similarly,
sports betting could be legalized in the United States
as a control measure.32 The biggest problem, Skol-
nick felt, was that governments addressed the wrong
question. They shouldn’t ask whether to legalize,
but, instead, what the goals of legalization should
be. In his estimation, suppression of organized crim-
inal control of and benefit from gambling was a
primary goal.33
Chairman Kaufman took issue with Skolnick’s
thesis, pointing out that legalizing the lottery in
New York hadn’t eliminated the illegal numbers
racket. Skolnick countered that legalization wasn’t
a panacea, but merely one of several options.34
Commissioner Dintino followed up with his obser-
vation that legalizing casinos in New Jersey had cre-
ated new gamblers, which he thought might actually
increase the volume of illegal gambling.35 Skolnick
responded that he wasn’t for blanket legalization,
but that in some cases, it made sense. Legalizing
sports betting, for example, wouldn’t increase the
24Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 17.
25Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 14–5.
26Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 18.
27Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 19.
28Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 20.
29Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 23.
30Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 23–5.
31Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 26.
32Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 26–7.
33Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 28.
34Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 30.
35Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.
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number of sports bettors, because, ‘‘anybody who
wants to bet on the Super Bowl, who can’t find a
bookmaker in this society, has to be regarded as
mentally deficient.’’36
Sensing that the testimony was losing focus,
Kaufman then reiterated that the Commission did
not come to ban gambling, but only to prevent orga-
nized crime from infiltrating it, to which Skolnick
whole-heartedly assented. After more questions
about the nature of the Central States Pension
Fund of the Teamsters in the organized crime infil-
tration of Nevada casinos, casino skimming, the
history of organized crime in gambling, the legali-
zation of sports betting, and the nature of college
athletics (Skolnick felt that they were not as legiti-
mately amateur as they purported to be), Chairman
Kaufman thanked Skolnick for his testimony and
excused him.37
Next, three law enforcement officials testified:
Frank J. Storey, Jr., then assistant special agent in
charge (ASAC) of the Organized Crime Branch,
Criminal Division, of the New York Office of the
FBI, who had just been assigned to become the sec-
tion chief of the Organized Crime Section at the
FBI’s Washington headquarters; Joseph DiPierro,
a 29-year NYPD veteran and current deputy inspec-
tor assigned to the Public Morals Division, under
the supervision of the Organized Crime Control
Bureau; and Lieutenant Robert Gaugler, a 23-year
New Jersey State Police veteran, who was assigned
to the Organized Crime Bureau.38
Storey provided an overview of how the FBI in-
vestigated illegal gambling, the extent to which
La Cosa Nostra and nontraditional organized
crime groups were active in illegal gambling,
and the official FBI policy on illegal gambling
investigations. Using three major investigative
techniques—informants, undercover operations,
and Title III wiretaps—the FBI and state police
had indicted and/or convicted members in LCN
families across the country.39 Storey spoke of the
important role that illegal gambling investigations
played in the FBI’s larger anti-LCN strategy, with
gambling serving as a window to develop evidence
to use in larger prosecutions of mob families, and
for using gambling and the collection of unlawful
debts ‘‘as excellent predicate offenses in obtaining
significant RICO prosecutions.’’40 As Deputy Coun-
sel Hunterton played a videotape of an in-progress
illegal sports bookmaking operation, Storey pro-
vided explanatory narration for the Commission.41
Following an extended discussion of FBI efforts
to stifle illegal sports betting and to work with
leagues in encouraging players to avoid compromis-
ing situations involving those connected to orga-
nized crime, Storey turned to Atlantic City where,
he said, eight regional LCN families had ramped
up their activities since the legalization of casinos:
The LCN’s influence extends to the construc-
tion of casinos, hotel service businesses,
which the Chairman had mentioned earlier,
junket operations, restaurant employees, deal-
ers, maids, and other ancillary services. The
common thread in controlling these businesses
is the LCN’s influence in the service-related
industries and unions.42
The complications of casino legalization in Atlantic
City became a theme that the Commission would
hear about extensively over the next two days.
Finally, Storey touted the FBI’s successful record
of 1,200 organized crime convictions in the previ-
ous two years, and avowed the FBI’s resolve to con-
tinue fighting the good fight against organized
crime and illegal gambling.43 After some
questions—in whose answers Storey lamented the
minimal sentences frequently handed out to those
convicted of gambling offenses—Storey yielded
the floor to Joseph DiPierro.44
DiPierro provided a narrower case study of orga-
nized crime control of illegal gambling in New York
City, using a series of photographs to show commis-
sioners the size and nature of illegal casinos in the
Gotham area. Essentially scaled-down casinos of
the type found in Las Vegas and Atlantic City,
they offered not only all of the usual table games,
but complementary food and drink, and even credit,
courtesy of a loanshark.45 He also highlighted the
growing presence of other ethnic groups, particu-
larly Cubans, in illegal gambling, especially policy
(illegal lottery games). Rather than representing the
36Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 36.
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triumph of armed conflict, DiPierro believed that
‘‘some kind of monetary agreement’’ had been
reached between LCN and the ethnic upstarts.46
Under questioning from executive director and
chief counsel James D. Harmon, Jr., DiPierro dis-
closed that, in the first quarter of 1985, the NYPD
had made 1,626 policy-related arrests in 1,072 sep-
arate locations.47 But without access to the RICO
statute that federal prosecutors could use, New
York City district attorneys had an abysmal track re-
cord of gaining convictions for gambling offenses;
DiPierro estimated that ‘‘there may be one or
two’’ incarcerations for gambling-related crimes,
though there were none of which he was personally
aware.48
After Harmon got DiPierro to discuss the diffi-
culties new technologies posed for investigations
(Cuban policy operators, in particular, were using
audio cassette tapes and computers to record and
tally bets), he shifted questioning to Lieutenant
Gaugler, who started by demonstrating a seized
video poker machine for the Commission. Gaugler
spoke at length about ‘‘dual mode’’ ‘‘Joker-Poker’’
machines that had both amusement and illegal gam-
bling modes, the latter of which was accessed by
pressing certain buttons and, when activated,
revealed a hidden bookkeeping program that could
track the total credits earned and ‘‘knocked off,’’ let-
ting the owner verify payouts.49 Such games could
generate ‘‘enormous’’ sums of money; one investi-
gation revealed that a mere five machines had gen-
erated $500,000 in profit (not revenues) for their
owner over a 15-month period.50
Following ASAC Storey’s avowal that ‘‘Joker-
Poker’’ machines were a growing problem nation-
wide, Deputy Counsel Hunterton opened the floor
to questions. DiPierro offered a few theories about
why illegal lotteries continued in New York City de-
spite the state having a legal lottery: namely, the
lack of taxes assessed on winners, and the ease of
play.51 Storey clarified the FBI’s policy in using
gambling to support RICO prosecutions, rather
than trying discrete gambling cases, and spoke
about the potential impact that sentencing changes
by the federal judiciary might have on FBI investi-
gative priorities. The commissioners, Storey and
DiPierro, discussed the merits of Professor Skol-
nick’s legalization-as-control schema; the law en-
forcement officers were leery of the concept.52
Following that trio of law enforcement testimony,
the Commission, pursuant to its charge to ‘‘define
the nature of emerging organized crime groups,’’
heard extended testimony from Commission inves-
tigator Anthony Lombardi, a former Internal
Revenue Service special agent, about ‘‘The Corpo-
ration,’’ a Cuban organized crime group.53 Accord-
ing to Lombardi, The Corporation’s existence was
due to a confluence of geo-political factors. He tes-
tified that a comprehensive review of all available
investigations had revealed:
the existence of a tightly knit, well-financed,
armed, and powerful group of Cuban racke-
teers known as ‘‘The Corporation.’’ These in-
dividuals are sometimes CIA trained and
anti-Castro sympathizers that had taken part
in the Bay of Pigs invasion.
As has been the case with other criminal
groups, including the Mafia, the Japanese
Yakuza, the Chinese Triad Societies, and Viet-
namese gangs, The Corporation traces its roots
to violent, political upheaval in other coun-
tries. When these countergovernment move-
ments were no longer able to influence
decisively political events in their countries,
some of their members turned to crime as a
way of life, capitalizing on longstanding orga-
nizational ties and methods of operation.
Many continue to fly the ‘‘false flag’’ of liber-
ation as a means to mask their purely criminal
activities and to attract new recruits. The
Mafia no longer uses this pretext upon which
to operate, having become so completely as-
similated as to be considered the preeminent
‘‘All-American’’ crime group.54
This group began to coalesce shortly after the failed
Bay of Pigs invasion, and had grown by the mid-
1980s to become a juggernaut, with an estimated
weekly gross take of $2 million for illegal lottery
games alone.55 At its helm sat a ‘‘chairman of the
board,’’ Jose Miguel Battle, Jr., who expanded into
46Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 71.
47Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 72.
48Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 73.
49Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 78–9.
50Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 84.
51Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 88.
52Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 90–5.
53Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 100–1.
54Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 102.
55Commission Hearings, supra note 1, at 103.
568 SCHWARTZ
new criminal areas using violence as well as accom-
modation with traditional LCN elements. Battle was
at one point a vice officer in Havana who had served
both in Batista’s army and the failed Bay of Pigs
landing group. Following the failure of that inva-
sion, he was declared a lieutenant in the U.S.
Army by a special congressional act and moved to
the Miami area, where he helped establish the
United States’ first Cuban-controlled gambling op-
eration. In the late 1960s, he moved to Union
City, New Jersey, and carved a name for himself
as ‘‘the Cuban Godfather’’ through relentless use
of murder and arson.56
Battle’s life story, and the relationships between
his Cuban-manned operations and traditional LCN
families in the New York City area, underscored
the Commission’s growing realization that orga-
nized crime was changing. This was big business;
Lombardi estimated that The Corporation was
‘‘conservatively valued at an estimated several hun-
dred million dollars, with an endless, substantial
cash inflow.’’57 The Corporation had also laundered
millions of dollars in illegal proceeds through finan-
cial institutions it controlled and the Puerto Rico
Lottery.58 To underscore The Corporation’s interna-
tional reach, New York Port Authority police officer
Joseph Pellicone testified as to the seizure of
$439,540 from Battle associates boarding a flight
to Miami, and Metro Dade police officer James
Leggett related a seizure of cash and Puerto Rico
Lottery tickets at Miami International Airport.59
Following a lunch break, the Commission heard
from a witness whose identity, for security pur-
poses, was kept secret, but whose bona fides were
vouched for in an affidavit by NYPD homicide de-
tective Richard Califas.60 A former member of The
Corporation, the witness testified about the organi-
zation’s structure, operating methods, and disciplin-
ary culture, which included arson and murders
subcontracted out to the Marielitos, hardened
Cuban criminals who were among the 125,000 ref-
ugees absorbed into the U.S. following the Mariel
boatlift.61 To make sure there was no confusion,
the witness testified that The Corporation was able
to operate in an LCN-dominated city like New
York by ‘‘sending envelopes [of cash] every
week.’’62
The next trio of witnesses were Sergeant Donald
Herlon, of the Chicago Police Department’s Organ-
ized Crime Vice Control Section, Gambling Unit;
Mark Vogel, a special attorney with the Organized
Crime Strike Force, Chicago, office, who had pros-
ecuted International Brotherhood of Teamsters pres-
ident Roy Williams, reputed Chicago mobster Joey
‘‘The Clown’’ Lombardo, and Teamsters pension
fund magnate Allen Dorfman; and Judith Dobkin,
another Chicago Strike Force prosecutor. Their tes-
timony had two purposes: to prove that illegal gam-
bling was not ‘‘an entirely victimless and nonviolent
crime,’’ and to show that ‘‘while this is a crime
which generally receives very short prison terms,
there can, with the effective investigation and pros-
ecution of well-targeted cases, result lengthy prison
terms.’’63
Herion described how ‘‘The Outfit,’’ as Chicago’s
organized crime was known, controlled all illegal
gambling in Chicago through means of a street
tax, which made The Outfit fifty-fifty partners
with any bookmakers who wanted to stay in busi-
ness.64 He described in great detail the business of
sports bookmaking, drawing on case studies of suc-
cessful investigations and arrests. As in New York
City, new technologies—in this case, call-forward-
ing services and beepers—were frustrating book-
making investigations.65 Though a series of
photographs, he demonstrated to the Commission
exactly what sports betting locations and wire
rooms looked like, and the difficulties that police
faced in retrieving useful evidence from them. In
addition, more than five thousand video poker ma-
chines, he testified, were in operation in the Chicago
region.66
After Vogel and Dobkin walked the Commission
through two representative prosecutions (that of
Frank P. Ballistrieri and Joseph ‘‘Caesar’’ Divarco,
respectively), the Commission heard from its last
witness of the day, Michael A. DePeo, the deputy
chief in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Sec-
tion, Criminal Division, United States Department
of Justice, and 22-year veteran of the department’s
Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Kansas City field
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offices. DePeo clarified the Justice Department’s
policy of reserving ‘‘electronic surveillance, exten-
sive grand jury inquiries, and other intensive tech-
niques’’ for cases involving a direct link to LCN
or situations involving law enforcement or political
corruption.67 DePeo described how, over the past 10
years, the department had reduced its commitment
to gambling enforcement from 50 percent to a max-
imum of 25 percent, freeing resources to be used for
more pressing racketeering and narcotics investiga-
tions.68
Following an extended conversation with DePeo
about the reality and potential of federal anti-
gambling action, the Commission adjourned for
the day.
Day two
On Tuesday, the Commission focused on two
major topics: first, organized crime’s role in fixing
college and professional sports events; and second,
how organized crime was able to profit from legal-
ized casino gambling in Atlantic City.
Starting the day, to get a perspective from a local
police official, the Commission heard from Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief Daryl
Gates. Gates boasted that he didn’t have much to
say, since ‘‘in Los Angeles and in the Southern Cal-
ifornia area we are relatively free of major problems
in the area of organized crime in gambling,’’ but nev-
ertheless discussed how, since 1972, an expansion of
legal gambling had caused an increase in illegal gam-
bling.69 He also related how a recent LAPD crack-
down on Chicago-area organized crime looking to
muscle in on disorganized local bookmakers, dubbed
‘‘Operation Lightweight,’’ had been successful.70
Despite his city’s good track record with control-
ling illegal gambling, Gates admitted that Los
Angeles was vulnerable to a potential organized
crime influx, and spoke of the need for new
tools—like a wiretapping statute—to combat the
potential problem. He also spoke about how legal
card clubs in Commerce and Bell had led to corrup-
tion cases involving local politicians, and closed his
testimony by warning of the social ills that the Cal-
ifornia lottery—which had been approved but had
yet to sell a ticket—would surely unleash on the
Golden State.71
Clinton Pagano, the superintendent of the New
Jersey State Police, followed Gates to give a state-
wide perspective. He described the difficulties of
pursuing anti-gambling prosecutions in ‘‘one of
the most wagering states in the nation,’’ and sought
to provide ‘‘a historical contrast of the effects of le-
galized gambling on illegal gambling, and the im-
pact of law enforcement policy and practices on
both legal and illegal gambling.’’72 In doing so, he
attacked three main points. First, he sought to ‘‘dis-
pel the myth, the ever-popular myth’’ that legalizing
gambling diminished sources of revenue for orga-
nized crime.73 In fact, he said, since the legalization
of the New Jersey Lottery, his force had continued
to make arrests for illegal lotteries, totaling 35 per-
cent of all gambling-related arrests.74 Legalizing ca-
sinos had similarly not decreased, in his estimation,
illegal casino-style gambling.
Second (and he was not aware that this point
tended to undercut his first), Pagano stated that
sports bookmaking was ‘‘by far the most lucrative
form of illegal gambling’’ in New Jersey. He recog-
nized that the state had a problem with illegal sports
bookmaking, and pointed with pride to the tremen-
dous resources, including electronic surveillance, it
had dedicated to solving the problem.75 Pagano’s
third point, that traditional elements of organized
crime remained deeply entrenched in gambling,
underscored the need for ‘‘law enforcement to con-
sider an aggressive posture toward illegal gam-
bling—a policy that has all but disappeared in
most jurisdictions because it is seen as a victimless
crime.’’76 He further stated that the state made no
claim to ‘‘eliminate’’ illegal gambling, but only
sought to control it—effectively undermining Pro-
fessor Skolnick’s assertion that legalization was
the surest path to state control of gambling.
Responding to a question from Chairman Kauf-
man, Pagano hypothesized that bookmakers had
been leaving New Jersey for New York and Phila-
delphia because of Garden State law enforcement’s
stronger track record of investigation and prosecu-
tion. And, responding to Kaufman’s request that
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either official comment on Skolnick’s legalization
hypothesis, Gates warned against the state becom-
ing a ‘‘shill’’ that produced more gambling, leading
to the proliferation of illegal gambling.77 Pagano
was similarly opposed to the legalization, though
he noted his responsibility to be attentive to the
will of voters who felt otherwise.78
Next the Commission heard from Ronald D.
Chance, supervisor of the Camden and Pomona,
New Jersey, Offices of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Office of Labor Racketeering, and
the supervisor of the Labor Department agents
assigned to the Camden Field Office for the Justice
Department’s Organized Crime Strike Force, who
spoke about LCN corruption of Local 54, the
hotel and restaurant union which represented work-
ers in Atlantic City casino hotels. He described the
control which reputed South Jersey underworld boss
Nicky Scarfo had established over the city, which
centered on his influence over the union, which
was an outstanding exemplar of labor racketeering:
Local 54, in Atlantic City, is a classic case
study in organized crime and labor racketeer-
ing. Several of the officers of this union and
its predecessor unions boast convictions for
murder, arson, extortion, drugs, bribes, kick-
backs and racketeering. Next to the ownership
of the casino itself, the control of Local 54 is
the most important prize in the Atlantic City
sweepstakes . The history of corruption in
this union predates the casinos, but the arrival
of casino gambling signaled the start of a new
quest for control of the local.79
Because of the massive amounts of cash flowing
through union pension funds, the funds’ exemption
from the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the political in-
fluence many unions enjoyed, there were in general
lush targets for mob takeovers. Local 54, because of
the burgeoning casino industry, was an even greater
prize.
Following on Chance’s testimony, Peter Bennett,
the Executive Assistant United States Attorney for
the District of New Jersey and the lead prosecutor
in the case of United States v. Matthews (this was
the trial that put former Atlantic City mayor Mike
Matthews behind bars), and Drug Enforcement
Agency Special Agent Jim Bannister testified
about the investigation of Matthews and Frank Len-
tino, an organizer for Local 54 and an associate of
Nicky Scarfo. As part of Operation Wild Bond,
Matthews had facilitated the sale of city-owned
land to a front group in exchange for a cash bribe to-
taling $20,000 and a continuing hidden interest in
the casino that was to be built on the property.80
Agent Bannister, who had played a key role in the
investigation in his undercover guise as the group’s
front man, Jim Biacco, narrated a series of taped
conversations, explaining to the Commission the
key points of the investigation. All in all, it was a
gripping tale of how high the links between orga-
nized crime and politicians could go.
The next set of witnesses testified directly about
the corruption of sports by gambling interests. They
included Edmundo Guevara, a former FBI special
agent and current President’s Commission investi-
gator; Edward McDonald, a former basketball
player for Boston College and current chief of the
Justice Department’s Organized Crime Strike
Force in Brooklyn, New York; and Rick Kuhn, the
disgraced former Boston College basketball star
who had been convicted in 1981 of bribery for his
role in a point-shaving scheme.81
Guevara related the history of college sports cor-
ruption linked to betting—since 1951, 31 institu-
tions and a total of 77 players had been caught in
scandals, typically involving point shaving. In de-
scribing the backdrop to the Boston College
case—in which former mobster Henry Hill testified
for the government—he mentioned several names
familiar to those who know the story behind Martin
Scorcese’s Goodfellas. This highlighted the high
stakes of amateur athletic corruption. McDonald
then narrated the nuts and bolts of the case, and
Kuhn offered the personal story of his involvement.
The Commission was so riveted by Kuhn’s testi-
mony that it kept him over through the lunch
break, finishing its discussion of the Boston College
case later that afternoon.82
Then another trio of witnesses came forward:
John Davis, president of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA); Lou Carnesecca,
St. John’s basketball coach; and Boston Globe
sports editor Vincent Doria. Davis, accompanied
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by NCAA counsel Michael Scott, spoke of the twin
plagues of drugs and gambling on college cam-
puses, decrying the ‘‘tragic social problem’’ of the
availability of drugs to young people and expressing
the NCAA’s vehement opposition to any form of
gambling on college sports.83 Davis pressed for a
national prohibition on gambling on college athlet-
ics, which would destroy it in Nevada, the only state
in which it was legal, and also for banning the trans-
mission of odds and point spread information about
college contests across state lines.84 He even la-
mented the ‘‘apparent constitutional limitations’’
that prevented Congress from outlawing the publi-
cation of any sort of gambling information related
to college athletics by newspapers.85 Coach Carne-
secca spoke about his efforts to keep the St. John’s
program clean and expressed unconditional support
for Davis’s proposals.86
Doria, however, struck a discordant note. He
defended the publication of betting information in
newspapers with the rational that gamblers were
‘‘very avid readers’’ who deserved to be ‘‘serviced.’’
What’s more, he didn’t believe that gambling was as
pernicious as the other witnesses:
My personal point of view is that I don’t think
gambling is going to go away. You can arrest
neighborhood bookies and crack down on
major gambling rings but the guy who wants
to place a bet on a game is going to find a
place to do it. I think the only way is to take
it away from organized crime by making it
legal and letting the government regulate it. I
don’t think there is anything inherently
wrong with gambling. Like drinking, smok-
ing, eating, it can be abused. We have heard
a lot of sad stories about the down and out
gambler who loss[es] his business, his home,
his family. They make very compelling read-
ing. But with all those stories, there are thou-
sands of people who derive great enjoyment
from making modest bets.87
This was as close to an ‘‘industry’’ perspective that
the Commission was going to hear on sports betting,
and with the law enforcement/prosecutorial orienta-
tion of the Commission, it was not greeted as
warmly as Davis and Carnesecca’s calls for en-
hanced prohibition and prosecution. He argued
that the legalization of sports gambling would
prevent point-shaving scandals, as government
monitoring of betting would eliminate the possibil-
ity of large bets being surreptitiously placed on sus-
picious contests, but was battered by pointed
questions from a number of commissioners citing
what they believed to be the predominant law en-
forcement view that legalized gambling would
only beget more illegal gambling.88
Howard Cosell, the eminent sportscaster and
commentator, followed that trio, speaking of box-
ing, but not before a wordy aside about the rising
need of ‘‘big time college sports’’ as a ‘‘Camelot
to the daily travail of human existence,’’ a danger-
ous trend he tied to fan violence.89 He also decried
the ‘‘mobocracy’’ of Doria’s assertion that he was
only giving readers what they wanted.90 Cosell
then spoke about his turn against professional box-
ing, and the history and potential current reality of
organized crime penetration of boxing. After seri-
ous soul searching, he had come to the conclusion
that ‘‘boxing’s ills are now so deep, so wide-
spread.that here in the United States we should
also abolish boxing.’’91 After Cosell’s emotional
and eloquent testimony, the appearance of James
Morley, the executive director of the New Jersey
Commission on Investigation, was almost an anti-
climax, though he shared in-depth information
about his commission’s investigations of the prob-
lems that he been plaguing boxing in the Garden
State. He felt that a stricter federal oversight of box-
ing was the only truly appropriate regulation of the
sport, and the only anodyne to rampant connections
with organized crime in boxing.92
Following Morley’s testimony, the Commission
adjourned until the following morning.
Day three
The final day of hearings was to focus the sharp-
est attention on casino gambling, with a particular
focus on Atlantic City. In introducing the day’s tes-
timony, Acting Chair Hope declared that ‘‘the mob
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is inexorably drawn to [legal casino] money as an
addict is drawn to drugs.’’93 The first witness was
Special Agent Ryan Corrigan, the IRS’s in-house
expert on casino skimming. Corrigan delivered a
brief, focused seminar on the diverse and treacher-
ous channels of skimming, theft, and embezzlement
of legal casino revenues derived from slot machines
and table games, as well as redit skims, fill slip
skims, kickbacks, and fraudulent expense claims.94
Corrigan included a call for ‘‘more resources, more
prosecutors,’’ as the best way to crack down on
skimming and related crimes.95 And commissioners
asked him several questions about junket-related
crimes, seguing into the next pair of witnesses.
William Kisby and Gregory Seitz were a pair of
New Jersey State Police detectives from the Casino
Intelligence Unit, who had been invited to testify by
Commissioner Dintino about an on-going investiga-
tion in the use by organized crime of junkets to skim
money from Atlantic City casinos. Kisby explained
how casino junkets, ‘‘legitimate marketing to entice
gamblers to visit gaming establishments,’’ were
regulated by the state. Typical junkets offered pre-
qualified gamblers free transportation, food, lodg-
ing, and entertainment in exchange for play.96 As
‘‘the lifeblood of a successful casino,’’ junkets
couldn’t be outlawed, but several problems inherent
in them—including the farming out of player
development to agents not working directly for the
casino—raised a host of problems that had allowed
the mob to elbow into Atlantic City casinos.
Kisby presented charts outlining an 89-count
racketeering indictment that had been secured
against 11 individuals and three corporations in
September, 1984, as well as entities and individuals
still under investigation—even as he testified, a
grand jury was reviewing evidence. The detective
explained that the investigation had uncovered a
centralized network of unlicensed (and, indeed,
unlicensable) individuals who controlled junket ac-
tivity across 65 cities in 25 states.97 Clever fiscal
analysis revealed that there was, undoubtedly,
money being skimmed off by organized crime, fun-
neled through bogus marketing and junket charges;
four casinos under investigation, which had affili-
ated themselves with an unlicensed operator con-
nected to the Bonnano crime family, had
marketing costs that, statistically, could not be justi-
fied by their win-ratio statistics. Kibsy related that
millions of dollars had been siphoned from casinos
per year.98 Up to 45 percent of licensed junket
operators, the investigation had determined, were
associated with ‘‘the network.’’99
Following Kisby’s testimony, Detective Seitz
walked the President’s Commission through his un-
dercover role in the investigation, including his in-
side view of a $10,000 payment by an cooperating
businessman to an associate of the DeCavalante
crime family, who had demanded the tribute in ex-
change for using his influence to secure junket busi-
ness for the businessman from an Atlantic City
casino.100 He additionally explained the context of
a tape in which a DeCavalcante associate remarked
that ‘‘the days of James Cagney and George Raft are
over,’’ and that organized crime families now settled
disputes through negotiations and compensation
rather than out-and-out violence; this gave everyone
an idea of the size and scope of the ‘‘network’’ that
throttled Atlantic City junket play.101
The following pair of witnesses also presented a
law enforcement story: Charlie Parsons, assistant
special agent in charge of the FBI’s Kansas City of-
fice (and formerly organized crime supervisor of the
Las Vegas office), and Richard C. Wassenaar, assis-
tant commissioner for criminal investigations of the
Internal Revenue Service, the Commissioner’s prin-
cipal adviser for all investigative activity. Parsons
explained how, since 1971, ten different casinos
had been involved in 20 cases involving up to 70 de-
fendants, which demonstrated the degree of orga-
nized crime influence in Nevada’s industry.102 He
traced organized crime’s influence from the
‘‘Founding Fathers’’ of the 1940s to the more recent
influx of Teamsters Central States Pension Fund
money. Parsons explained that, acting as middlemen
between casino owners and Jimmy Hoffa, who
stood astride the fund’s coffers, LCN families
were able to gain influence in the next generation
of Las Vegas casinos.103
More specifically, Parsons walked the Commis-
sion through the Strawman investigation, which
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had captured conversations between Kansas City
underworld leaders and Joe Agosto and Carl Tho-
mas of the Tropicana Hotel in Las Vegas, who
explained to his friends from the Paris of the Plains
the ins and outs of casino skimming. ‘‘One of the
best tapes in my experience in law enforcement,’’
Parsons called it before playing a portion of the
tape and summarizing from the transcript when
members of the Commission objected to its poor
sound quality.104 He then answered Hunterton’s
questions about the Argent skimming case, which
was the basis for Martin Scorcese’s film Casino.
Wassemar followed Parons with specific testimony
about the tax evasion aspects of the cases the FBI
agent had discussed. Parsons closed by reiterating
that not all was rotten in the state of Nevada:
‘‘there are more legitimate operators,’’ he reminded
the Commission, alluding to a witness who would
be appearing that afternoon.105
The next witness, however, was Frank Cullotta,
then in federal witness protection (he testified
from behind a screen and with television cameras
removed from the room), who shared his story of
rising through the ranks of Chicago’s underworld
to become a trusted lieutenant of notorious mobster
Tony Spilotro in Las Vegas.106 It was vivid, lurid
testimony, with Culotta freely sharing tales of bur-
glary, murder, extortion, drug trafficking, and ca-
sino skimming. Culotta was brief, but colorful,
giving LCN influence in Las Vegas casinos the
kind of personal color that Rick Kuhn had given
sports corruption.
From here, the Commission pivoted to the topic
of money laundering, hearing from its own investi-
gator, Thomas Sheehan, a 20-year Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) veteran who spoke
about how ‘‘organized crime has used casinos like
private banks to launder the proceeds of narcotic
trafficking.’’107 Atlantic City’s proximity to two
major heroin markets made it particularly vulnera-
ble to use as a laundering center, but this was a po-
tential problem at all casinos.
Sheehan outlined three primary money launder-
ing techniques: first, using casinos to exchange
small bills for large ones; second, using casinos to
wire money to offshore accounts, or to loan back
to a client; and third, transferring money from a ca-
sino in the United States to another outside the U.S.,
where it could be issued as credit to anyone.108 Let
anyone think that this was merely theoretical, Shee-
han told the tale of Anthony ‘‘Tony Cakes’’ Castel-
buono, who had deposited $2.5 million, allegedly in
heroin cash, at the Golden Nugget Atlantic City, in
late 1982.109 To that end Stephen Wynn, Chairman
of the Golden Nugget, was slated as the next wit-
ness. In Sheehan’s words, he was ‘‘to explain what
measures casino operators can take to make it
more difficult for organized crime to profit from
casinos.’’110
Wynn didn’t come alone; he brought three
executives who just happened to have immaculate
anti-crime pedigrees: Alfred Luciani, a former dep-
uty attorney general; Marilou Marshall, former staff
attorney for the Commission on the Review of the
National Policy toward Gambling and his in-house
counsel; and Shannon Bybee, vice president of
community affairs and a former member of the
Nevada Gaming Control Board.
The youthful casino owner was diplomatic, but
prickly about the nature of the proceedings:
I came here today at the invitation of Counsel
Hunterton because first of all I had prior
knowledge of Mr. Hunterton’s work with the
Organized Crime Strike Force in Las Vegas
and, like a lot of people in the gambling indus-
try, a good deal of respect for Mr. Hunterton’s
accomplishments. It’s when he explained to
me what the Commission’s purpose was, it
was easy to anticipate that the course of events
would involve the presentation of witnesses
such as Mr. Cullotta that was here earlier.
I was not particularly delighted to find my-
self or any of my colleagues present during a
colloquy involving people of this caliber.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the Commission
in our view was valid and admirable and
afforded us an opportunity to participate in a
process that could result in an improvement
of the situation and could lead to progress.
Earlier this week you have had some very,
very distinguished people here. I watched on
CNN as Professor Skolnick helped open the
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proceedings here in New York. He is, I am
proud to say, a very good friend of mine.111
Wynn went on to restate Skolnick’s arguments
about the lengthy nature of ‘‘legitimization,’’ or
gaining of respect and credibility, from a former pa-
riah industry, and his commitment to that process.
Chairman Kaufman acknowledged Wynn’s efforts
in that respect, quipping about whether he was giv-
ing his guests more towels, a reference to a televi-
sion commercial starring the casino owner and
Frank Sinatra.
Substantively, Wynn focused on three areas in
which he thought offered ‘‘room for improvement
and progress’’ in the fight against organized crime.
The first was ‘‘the dialogue between law enforce-
ment and the gaming industry’’; the second was
labor racketeering, where although Wynn had no
personal knowledge of mob infiltration of casino-
related unions, he was eager to see the federal
government increase its jurisdiction over unions; fi-
nally, in the area of ‘‘information,’’ which raised a
fundamental philosophical split with the Commis-
sion. ‘‘We are not a law enforcement agency,’’
Wynn said, ‘‘and we cannot be presumed to have
knowledge of people that the FBI possesses. To as-
sume so is unfair.’’112
In particular, Wynn promised to tell ‘‘a very dif-
ferent story’’ about the saga of Tony Cakes. He
spoke of six hours of surveillance videotape
recorded by the casino, documenting Mr. Castel-
buono from the time he set foot on the property;
how Castelbuono’s deposits had triggered ‘‘every
alarm and buzzer and bell’’ and set the Golden Nug-
get’s compliance system into action; how executives
were immediately notified that something unusual
was taking place; how this was a higher standard
of care than one would find in a New York bank;
how the money was isolated and Castelbuono told
it would remain inert until he had shown that he
had come to play, not merely make change.113 Up
until this point, they were unsure what to make of
Castelbuono. This was the first time they’d seen
him. Was he a ‘‘crazy person’’ who wanted to turn
small bills into big ones, or ‘‘an eccentric gambler,
which is not unusual in our environment?’’114
When Castelbuono began betting ten- to twenty-
thousand dollars per hand at baccarat, losing
$360,000 in approximately six hours, with
$800,000 still on deposit, it was clear that he was
a gambler. But he was warned not to bring small
bills in again. Despite his agreeing not to, the casino
instituted its own investigation, which was covered
in a memorandum Wynn entered into evidence.115
Wynn claimed the system worked; but Harmon
pressed him, wanting to know who gave a money
launderer permission to gamble such large sums
of small bills at his casino. As the chairman of the
parent company, Wynn assured him that he was
not that person, but was adamant that his system
had worked. Harmon tried to get him to admit that
a casino owner had a ‘‘moral responsibility’’ to
halt the laundering of narcotics cash, but Wynn par-
ried that blow, admitting to only a ‘‘very legal’’ re-
sponsibility to run his business properly.116 He
insisted that no one had been allowed to change
small bills for large ones. When confronted with
the testimony of the Chairman of the Bank of Bos-
ton, who had accepted a moral responsibility for
compliance, Wynn again wriggled out, instead
choosing to continue the Castelbuono story. His
company’s investigation revealed that Castelbuono
was a graduate of Fordham and Harvard Law
School, that he had no arrest record, and that he
appeared to be not a money launderer, but ‘‘an attor-
ney who is a very heavy gambler.’’117 With this due
diligence conducted, he was allowed to continue
gambling, losing a total of $1,150,000—not the
modus operandi of a successful money launderer.118
Wynn then embraced the ‘‘moral responsibility’’
of assuring compliance, stressing this was why he
hired executives with impeccable law enforcement
credentials. He even related that Frank Storey, the
career FBI man, had interviewed for a job with
him before deciding to take his current post in
Washington. He lamented the double standard to
which his industry was subjected (‘‘we don’t inves-
tigate Tiffany’s and Saks Fifth Avenue and Van
Cleef & Arpels’’). ‘‘It is painful,’’ he said, ‘‘because
my company is 5,500 fine people. We have nothing
in common with Culotta or heroin importers.’’119
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Wynn then strongly objected to Harmon’s lead-
ing questions about credit and chip control proce-
dures, which suggested that, ‘‘there are really no
records in the casino by which a person can look’’
to see whether the credit player had won, lost, or
given his chips to someone else.120 ‘‘Wrong,’’ he
insisted:
If he doesn’t start gambling and walks away
from the table an alarm bell goes off and we
call the cage and a shift boss and a floor super-
visor and we watch the man move back to the
cage and when he tries to do that, and we do
this all the time, we say hello, whoa, sir. We
have better things to do than to play hide the
weenie with the credit documents. What is
your intention here? We stop this sort of activ-
ity from taking place. It has never been a prob-
lem for us once we understood it years ago,
any more than money laundering is a problem
for us. So we don’t let that happen in reality.121
Wynn, answering continued questions about why
Castelbuono’s friend was allowed to withdraw the
money Castelbuono had deposited, reiterated that
his casino would not abide money laundering, but
that, ‘‘once a man comes with his money as a gam-
bler, we allow him freedom to move within our
premises.’’122 Backpedaling now, Wynn said that
‘‘they are all one large group,’’ and admitted that
he gambled not under his birth name, but as
‘‘Tony Cakes,’’ and admitted he was unsure as to
whether customers could deposit money under ali-
ases as a matter of policy in his casino, though
after conferring with his executives, he clarified
that a social security number and proper identifica-
tion was necessary, though an additional pseudo-
nym could be attached to the account.123 When
asked if he knew him as ‘‘Tony Cakes,’’ Wynn
was indignant. ‘‘I wouldn’t call anybody Tony
Cakes. I couldn’t stand to call anybody something
as silly as that . It’s laughable.’’124
Things then got even more disagreeable, with
Wynn ‘‘taking some issue’’ with the Commission’s
perception that the Golden Nugget’s internal inves-
tigative report was slipshod.125 He further argued
about the point of the Treasury Department’s re-
cently enacted currency transaction reporting guide-
lines, which he said were not bona fide anti-money
laundering tools, but instead a method of collecting
more taxes. ‘‘It is doomed to failure,’’ he said.126
Additionally, he brushed aside Harmon’s claim
that 14 Golden Nugget customers had not complied
with currency transaction report (CTR) reporting re-
quirements as ‘‘misleading,’’ before finishing his
testimony and thanking Chairman Kaufman for
the opportunity to testify.127
Thomas Sheehan then returned to the witness
table after the lunch break and briefly recapitulated
his testimony about the Tony Cakes case before IRS
revenue agent Martin Molod, who had previously
testified before the Commission about money laun-
dering, spoke about his examination of the records
of the Golden Nugget relative to Tony Cakes. He la-
boriously reconstructed the nature of the cash de-
posit, down to estimating its total net weight of
280 pounds and size of 5.75 cubic feet.128
Then the final two witnesses appeared. They
were Thomas R. O’Brien, the director of New Jer-
sey’s Division of Gaming Enforcement, and Jeffery
Silver, a former Nevada Gaming Control Board
member who was currently an attorney in private
practice. O’Brien spoke of the larger gains that
legal casino gaming had netted New Jersey:
45,000 jobs, $500 million in annual tax revenue,
and $1.5 billion in capital investment in Atlantic
City.129 While admitting there were problems—
namely compulsive gambling and the attraction of
criminal elements—O’Brien insisted that casino
gaming was worth it.
Silver, expressing his macabre sense of humor,
started his testimony by wondering if he should
have worn a ‘‘black hood, having been an avowed
resident of the State of Nevada,’’ feeling that he
was ‘‘playing on a baseball team as a cleanup hit-
ter.not necessarily the home team here.’’ He fur-
ther stated that he believed a resident of Nevada
would have brought more balance to the panel.130
Like Wynn and O’Brien, he admitted that the indus-
try could do more to clean up some of the problems
associated with it, and stressed the steps casinos had
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taken to create large, proactive security departments
that investigated vendors and even customers. He
also pointed out that even informal help—such as
ASAC Parsons walking the floor of the Riviera
with him after he became the property’s presi-
dent—could go a long way.
More importantly, he launched into a vigorous
defense of Las Vegas and Nevada:
Las Vegas is not the 50,000 population that we
once had. It is 500,000. And there aren’t
500,000 members of organized crime in
Nevada. There are a lot of good people in
Nevada that depend upon this industry for
their lifeblood. I feel that if we take a look
and see what we have done to correct the situ-
ation, the large companies coming through,
the auditing controls that have been placed
upon some of these organizations, the audits
by reputable Big 8 CPA firms, the expansion
of the regulatory system—when I was there,
there were 76 agents, now there are 350
agents, on the Gaming Control Board; the so-
phistication of the investigative process—all
of these things lend credence to the fact that
there is an active effort to remove organized
crime’s influence. And the ten or twelve
cases that are shown on the board from 1971
to the present represent an insignificant por-
tion of what the actual activities of the gaming
industry are.131
Further, Silver took personal umbrage at Kaufman’s
statements that he didn’t want to even visit Las
Vegas, saying that it was ‘‘a cross section of Amer-
ica’’ with a great deal of ‘‘pizazz’’ but also churches
and schools.132
Questioning then whipsawed back to O’Brien,
who spoke in greater detail about the benefits
legal casino gaming had brought New Jersey, in-
cluding, according to one study, an improvement
in the state’s self-image.133 He also expressed
pride that the Casino Control Act had built in sev-
eral safeguards that would prevent the industry
from ever exercising undue political influence.
And, when questioned about the Mike Matthews
case, he was quick to point out that there was no
connection between that case and any casino li-
censee. While admitting that the industry had been
victimized by organized crime, he was adamant
that good regulation could keep mob presence to a
minimum.134 After more questioning about the dif-
ferences in regulatory stringency between Nevada
and New Jersey, the hearings were over.
THE COMMISSION’S LEGACY
After hearing from 36 witnesses over three days,
the President’s Commission drew two paragraphs
worth of conclusions:
The record of this hearing demonstrates that
there is a continuing and self-perpetuating re-
lationship between gambling and organized
crime. Unlike illegal drugs, for example,
which are in large part controlled by some
form of organized crime and which are univer-
sally condemned, gambling is not an activity
which is thought to be a harmful practice in
and of itself, notwithstanding organized
crime’s persistent involvement. Much of
what we have saw and heard in the three
days of hearings lends credence to the view
that gambling, legal or illegal, is considered
to be a relatively harmless pursuit, with no
serious negative effects on society or the
individual.
The result has obviously been to make ille-
gal gambling the ‘‘highest profit-lowest risk’’
business in which organized crime groups
can involve themselves. No other form of ille-
gal activity has a ‘‘profit vs. risk’’ ratio as at-
tractive as gambling. Thus, so long as this
situation exists, involvement of organized
crime in gambling will continue, and law en-
forcement efforts in this regard will continue
to have only limited success. The extent to
which illegal gambling should be targeted, ei-
ther as unacceptable or as a revenue source for
other.organized criminal activities, and the
priority to be given to any such targeting, is
one of the more challenging subjects facing
policy makers and law enforcement officials
in the near future.135
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Those conclusions were, for some Commission
members, frustratingly vague, merely stating that
a problem existed and that it would continue to be
a problem, no matter what tactics law enforcement
used to weed organized crime out of gambling.
This was emblematic of the larger issues the
President’s Commission on Organized Crime
faced. Indeed, in an appendix attached to its final re-
port, nine of the Commission’s members character-
ized their work as ‘‘a saga of a missed opportunity,’’
citing poor time management and a failure to con-
front major issues in the Commission’s charge.136
Those who made the charges included representa-
tives of both the law enforcement and private prac-
tice camps, showing that this wasn’t an ideological
split, but rather a disagreement about the Commis-
sion’s fundamental role. Allowing the Justice
Department to focus on case-by-case enforcement
efforts, they felt, didn’t do much to address the big-
ger problem of organized crime in society. Notably,
no major piece of legislation, like 1970s RICO,
emerged from this panel.
In the end, the President’s Commission was bet-
ter known for its work on Asian gangs, money laun-
dering, and a controversial proposal to begin
widespread, nationwide testing of American work-
ers for drug abuse. A New York Times editorial sum-
marized the views of Commission skeptics when it
said that the group’s ‘‘final report marks some ad-
vance in public understanding, but the book on the
mob remains to be written.’’137
In the smaller field of gambling, however, the
President’s Commission hearings were an interest-
ing halfway point. By beginning with the under-
standing that gambling would not go away, despite
the most draconian efforts at prohibition, it accepted
the new reality that many states and the federal gov-
ernment had woken up to. Yet its fundamental
conclusion, that gambling would continue to be
plagued by organized crime, seems misplaced.
Barely a decade later, the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission concluded that, ‘‘effec-
tive state regulation, coupled with the takeover of
much of the industry by public corporations, has
eliminated organized crime from the direct owner-
ship and operation of casinos.’’138
The NGISC raised entirely different questions
than were asked at the 1985 hearings, and arrived
at a far more positive depiction of the industry. It’s
worth noting the late-1990s group had a far more bal-
anced membership, with representatives from the
fields of gaming regulation, management, and labor.
Yet the President’s Commission on Organized
Crime should be known as more than a missed op-
portunity. It was, in a sense, the last gasp of a strictly
law-enforcement approach to gambling. Just a de-
cade later, Professor Skolnick’s views on the bene-
ficial nature of legalization would receive far less
opprobrium than they had in 1985; indeed, he
might be considered a bit puritanical for his insis-
tence that gambling legalization shouldn’t be driven
primarily by revenue concerns but rather for its role
in promoting greater government oversight of a dif-
ficult business.
From the distance of a generation, it is clear that
the President’s Commission, though its work on
gambling was criticized as incomplete, and though
it did not change the government’s fundamental ap-
proach to gambling, stands as a division point in the
history of the legal casino gaming industry. Before
the hearings, it was on the defensive because of its
associations with organized crime. After them, it
still suffered occasional public relations and legisla-
tive roadblocks, but it was well on its way to taking
its place, in Skolnick’s words, as a thoroughly ‘‘le-
gitimized’’ and not merely ‘‘legalized’’ business.
136Ronald J. Ostrow, Key Issues Not Dealt With, Half of Crime
Panel Says, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1986.
137Writing the Book on the Mob, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1986.
138National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final
Report 3-1 (1999).
578 SCHWARTZ
